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Introduction 
In many countries the outsourcing of public services to the private sector is 
accelerating (Batley and Larbey, 2004; Hart, 2007). While contrary claims are 
common (for example, Grimshaw et al., 2002; Davies, 2010), this acceleration is often 
justified on the basis that private sector providers can deliver at least the same quality 
of services as their public sector counterparts, but for a considerably lower price 
(Julius, 2008).  
 
One consequence of this increasing use of the private sector is that procurement and 
contract management has become ever more important to public sector management. 
However, it would be wrong to assume that there is a settled consensus on what 
constitutes effective public sector procurement and contract management, not least 
when it comes to the emphasis that should be placed upon intentional trust in the 
procurement and contract management process, as against using the process to 
mitigate potential supplier opportunism (for example, Bovaird, 2006; Lonsdale et al, 
2010). The debate over this issue is crucial, as clarity over the challenges and 
objectives of the procurement and contract management process is critical to the 
delivery of satisfactory outcomes. 
 
In this article, the authors contribute to this debate by reporting on the procurement 
and contract management practices of public and private sector organisations. In 
particular, we consider quantitative evidence on the perceived effectiveness of various 
buy-side management control mechanisms aimed at restraining supplier opportunism, 
when transaction characteristics make opportunism a possibility.  
 
We test three hypotheses derived from the literature, particularly Williamson (1985 
and 1996), in pursuit of this research objective. First, we hypothesize that the more a 
transaction is hazardous the less extensive the management control mechanisms will 
be. Second, we hypothesize that an increased extensiveness of management control 
mechanisms will reduce incidences of supplier opportunism. Finally, we test a 
hypothesis concerning the relationship between transaction characteristics and 
supplier opportunism, both with and without the intervening variable of management 
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control mechanisms. This is again to assess the impact of management control 
mechanisms. 
 
The data used to test these hypotheses are derived from 180 questionnaire responses 
provided by procurement professionals working in buying organisations. We asked 
respondents to classify a procurement and contract management situation in terms of 
the transaction characteristics, report on the procurement and contract management 
actions taken in the situation and then report perceptions of the outcome in terms of 
incidences of supplier opportunism. The sample included both public and private 
sector respondents, allowing us to measure differences between the two sectors. 
 
Our key findings are that certain procurement and contract management mechanisms 
can assist buying organisations in moderating supplier opportunism, but that some 
transaction characteristics make the use of certain management mechanisms difficult. 
We found no significant differences between public and private sector experiences in 
any part of the study. In terms of theory, our evidence provides support for the view 
that the economics of contracts should be based on an assumption of supplier 
opportunism rather than intentional trust (Williamson, 1993). This suggests that there 
is a need for a cautious approach to procurement and contract management practice.   
 
The article is organised as follows: section two briefly discusses the literature dealing 
with intentional trust, opportunism and management control mechanisms; section 
three describes the methodology adopted; section four reports the results of our 
hypothesis testing; section five concludes with a summary of key results and a 
discussion of their implications for public sector procurement and contract 
management practice.  
 
Trust and Opportunism in Procurement and Contract Management 
There is a critical debate within the public sector management literature, reflecting a 
similar debate in the wider management literature, over the emphasis that should be 
placed upon intentional trust in the procurement and contract management process 
(for example, Lane 1999; Bovaird and Halachmi, 2001; Grimshaw et al, 2002; Watt, 
2005; Bovaird, 2006; Lonsdale et al, 2010). In the procurement context, intentional 
trust is defined as the expectation of one party to an exchange that the other party will 
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not take advantage of commercial vulnerabilities even when there is an incentive to do 
so (Nooteboom, 2002). This is distinct from competence trust (Sako, 1992), which is 
an equally important concept, but not the focus of this article. This particular debate 
does not concern the benefits of intentional trust, should it be successfully created. 
These have been well charted and agreed upon in the literature and include reduced 
transaction costs (search, negotiation, contracting and monitoring costs) and an 
increased level of value creation (Chiles and McMakin, 1996). The debate is more 
about the feasibility of its creation and about how its absence in a purchase situation 
should be addressed.  
 
There are many that contend that the creation of intentional trust within buyer-
supplier relationships is eminently feasible and can then facilitate the above-
mentioned benefits. The reasoning behind this is varied, but covers benign views 
about human nature (Ghoshal and Moran, 1996), the identification of national cultures 
that facilitate communitarian beliefs and actions (Lane and Bachmann, 1996), 
contentions that it is possible to both profit from and signal intentional trustworthiness 
(Ugoji et al, 2007) and arguments that stress the social obligations and confidence that 
arise out of repeated interactions (Gulati, 1995).  
 
Beyond these ideas about the creation of intentional trust are a number of related 
actions believed to enhance the potential for trust to be maintained over time. First, it 
is argued that managers should refrain from aggressive and controlling behaviour 
during pre-contractual negotiations, because such behaviour is likely to encourage ‘tit-
for-tat’ behaviour, as modelled by the prisoner’s dilemma (Axelrod and Hamilton, 
1981). Second, it is argued that managers should clearly communicate their ‘interests’ 
to the other party so as to reduce the chance of misunderstandings and ill-feeling 
(Kinnaird and Movius, 2008).  
 
Third, some argue that formal contracts are incompatible with intentional trust and 
should be avoided where possible. Malhotra and Murnighan (2002, p. 553), for 
example, state that formal, binding contracts ‘crowd out’ intentional trust as they 
affect an individual’s ‘underlying attributional processes’. A variant on this is that 
formal contracts can co-habit with intentional trust, but only if they are not too 
restrictive (Bovaird and Halachmi, 2001; Forder et al., 2004). Finally, it is said that 
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managers from the two parties should adopt established techniques to enhance and 
maintain intentional trust, including supplier reward schemes, buyer-supplier forums, 
and dispute resolution mechanisms (Office of Government Commerce, 2002; 
Lonsdale and Watson, 2007). Once intentional trust has been developed, it is argued 
that it can be a mechanism for making contracts self-enforcing. Suppliers deliver upon 
their promises and, where relevant, deal fairly with the consequences of uncertainty, 
because they feel a social obligation to do so (Granovetter, 1985).  
 
Others within this debate, however, are less optimistic. Williamson (1993), for 
example, rejects the usefulness of the concept of intentional trust. He believes instead 
that the economics of contracts should be based upon an assumption of supplier 
opportunism and involve a cautious approach. This approach is said to hold even if it 
is believed that relationships based on trust can and do exist between buyers and 
suppliers. This is because, even if you believe only a significant minority of suppliers 
are prone to opportunistic actions, it is hard to tell ex ante which those are. The 
concept of opportunism in economics is understood as self-interest seeking actions 
that go beyond the traditional neo-classical concept of simple self-interest seeking 
(Williamson, 1985). These actions can either be blatant or subtle (Williamson, 1996).  
 
A key type of blatant opportunism is the hold-up problem, which can be defined as a 
situation where a supplier refuses to continue to supply, or to supply at a particular 
level of performance, unless its increased demands are met. This threat can be 
credible in situations where the buyer’s ability to switch to alternative suppliers is 
constrained by either time or relationship-specific investments. The problem is 
particularly serious when a contract is characterised by uncertainty as this will force a 
buying organisation to sign an incomplete contract, one that is completed through 
negotiations during the contract period. If the buyer’s ability to switch is constrained, 
it may well undertake those negotiations from a weak position (Lonsdale, 2005).  
 
Key types of subtle opportunism include adverse selection and moral hazard 
(Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). Adverse selection is defined as a situation where, 
because of a lack of information, a buying organisation pays a price for a good or 
service that is based upon an erroneous belief about the quality of that good or 
service. In such a scenario, the supplier deliberately fails to address the buyer’s lack 
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of necessary information. Moral hazard is a situation where a supplier underperforms 
in order to improve its profits on a contract, safe in the knowledge that the buyer finds 
it difficult to monitor its performance. Two common manifestations of moral hazard 
are shirking and quality shading (Lonsdale and Watson, 2007). 
 
Reasons cited for the existence of opportunism in business relationships include 
frailties in human nature (Williamson, 1985), individualistic national culture (Lane 
and Bachmann, 1996), and amoral business education (Ghoshal and Moran, 1996), as 
well as transaction complexity, uncertainty, asset specificity and credence qualities 
(Williamson, 1985).  
 
In terms of how managers should cope with the existence of opportunistic intent in a 
significant minority of suppliers, a cautious approach has been advanced, involving 
the employment of extensive management control mechanisms (Williamson, 1985 
and 1996; Anderson and Dekker, 2005). First, it is said that buy-side managers should 
carefully research and agree upon both their own organisation’s purchase 
requirements and the capabilities and reputation of the supply market (Hughes and 
Dickson, 2009). Second, buy-side managers should retain an awareness of the role 
reputation can play in a cautious approach (Bowles and Gintis, 1999). 
 
Third, it is said that the buyer should, following careful negotiation, contract formally 
in the first instance and then look to ‘keep the contract in the drawer’. Contracting 
formally means developing legal clauses where the absence of uncertainty makes it 
possible and developing private enforcement capital where the presence of uncertainty 
means it is not (Klein, 1996). ‘Keeping the contract in the drawer’ does not mean 
ignoring the contractual provisions, but rather translating them into a set of working 
procedures, understandings and expectations. If monitoring subsequently reveals that 
these are not being adhered to then this will see the legal specifics of the contract 
being reintroduced. 
  
Those that adhere to this cautious approach believe that, contrary to the arguments of, 
for example, Malhotra and Murnighan (2002), the best chance of developing a 
relationship underpinned by intentional trust is through establishing at the outset a 
clear and detailed legal agreement. It is argued that such an agreement reduces the 
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scope for misunderstandings and mitigates the fear of receiving the ‘sucker’s pay-off’. 
The idea of a contract ‘crowding out’ intentional trust is not recognised by this 
approach, not least as it is believed that managers respect the other party’s 
requirement for legal security. Furthermore, even when such an agreement does not 
promote intentional trust, it still provides the basis for compliance. 
 
For this group, therefore, fear of opportunism suggests a need for caution in 
procurement and contract management, with extensive management control structures 
suggested, especially in the case of potentially hazardous transactions (Forder et al., 
2004). Proponents of this approach do not deny that it imposes higher transaction 
costs. Nor do they deny that it can cause buying organisations to miss numerous 
opportunities to develop productive relationships with suppliers that had no intention 
of acting opportunistically. However, they argue that these costs are outweighed by 
the prospect of lower opportunism costs over the long run.  
 
Having outlined the relevant parts of the debate over intentional trust, supplier 
opportunism and their management, we now present quantitative evidence on public 
and private sector procurement and contract management practice. Specifically, we 
aim to investigate the contention in the literature that various buy-side management 
control mechanisms are effective at restraining supplier opportunism, when 
transaction characteristics make opportunism a possibility. In that sense, we are 
investigating the cautious approach introduced above.  
 
Methodology 
In this study, we tested three hypotheses derived from the literature (see Figure 1) in 
pursuit of our research objective. The first hypothesis concerns the relationship 
between transaction characteristics and management control mechanisms and posits 
that the more a transaction is hazardous the less extensive the management control 
mechanisms will be. The reasoning behind this hypothesis is that extensive 
knowledge of purchase requirements, extensive communication of that knowledge to 
suppliers, extensive knowledge of pricing, extensive monitoring, negotiation and 
contract drafting, the effective establishment of the supplier's track record and 
credible threats of legal action will be more difficult the more a transaction is 
hazardous. This is because the greater the hazards become the greater the strain they 
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will put on the ‘feasible foresight’ of managers with bounded rationality (Williamson, 
1996).  
 
Figure 1 here 
 
The second hypothesis concerns the relationship between management control 
mechanisms and incidences of supplier opportunism, and posits that increases in the 
extensiveness of management control mechanisms will reduce incidences of supplier 
opportunism (Williamson, 1985; Anderson and Dekker, 2005). That is, it posits that a 
cautious approach will be effective.  
 
The third hypothesis concerns the relationship between transaction characteristics and 
supplier opportunism, both with and without the intervening variable of management 
control mechanisms. This hypothesis was advanced to provide a further test of the 
impact of management control mechanisms on supplier opportunism. We test the 
argument that more hazardous transaction characteristics will lead to increased 
incidences of supplier opportunism, but that this outcome will be influenced by the 
extensiveness of management control mechanisms. 
 
We undertook tests of the hypotheses using structural equation modelling (SEM) and 
LISREL 8.8 (Jöreskog and Sörbom, 2006).
1
 The characteristics of the sample that 
facilitated the tests and the variable measures used are now described. 
 
Sample details 
The evidence used to conduct our investigation is from 180 responses provided by 
procurement (buy-side) professionals to a cross-sectional questionnaire survey. A 
copy of the questionnaire is available from the authors upon request. Most of the 
respondents filled out the questionnaire while at the authors’ institution attending a 
procurement-related event; a smaller number, attendees at earlier events, responded 
by post or email. The questionnaire asked respondents to classify a contract 
management situation in terms of the transaction characteristics, report on the 
procurement and contract management actions taken and report on the perceived 
outcome in terms of incidences of supplier opportunism. The nature of the sample 
meant that the response rate was high, about 50%. 
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Following Anderson and Dekker (2005), supply-side perceptions of the transactions 
were not collected. Safeguards against false reporting on the part of the buy-side 
respondents, particularly with respect to perceptions of transaction outcomes, included 
both an offer of anonymity and privacy at the time of completing the questionnaire. 
This was aimed at removing any risk of an ‘audience effect’. There was also careful 
selection of the sample. The managers asked to participate in the research were 
selected on the basis of their association with the authors’ institution (through 
attendance at conferences, courses, workshops, etc.). While this buy-side focused 
convenience sampling might have limited the representativeness of the survey it did 
mean that the respondents were academically informed managers with an interest in 
contributing to robust research findings within their vocational area.  
 
It can also be plausibly argued that buy-side managers are a more reliable source of 
data than supply-side managers on the issue of supplier opportunism. Buy-side 
managers tend to see addressing supplier opportunism as a standard part of their role 
(Lonsdale and Watson, 2007), whereas supply-side managers tend to be reluctant to 
admit opportunism, not least as some forms of opportunism fall outside of commercial 
law. Finally, while the respondents were asked to provide their perceptions of the 
transaction outcomes, the phrasing of the questions regarding outcome were 
specifically designed to encourage objectivity.  
 
The aforementioned offer of anonymity means that the demographic breakdown of the 
sample is not complete - a proportion of the respondents opted to leave blank some or 
all of the personal details section of the questionnaire. The only personal detail that 
was insisted upon was whether their employment was in the public or private sector 
(104 and 76 respondents respectively). Anonymity was also one element of the ethical 
approval process related to this project. Other aspects were assurances over the 
storage and use of the data, voluntary participation and an offer of privacy during 
questionnaire completion, facilitating non-participation. 
 
On the basis of the information possessed by the researchers, however, the following 
breakdown can be reported. Many purchase categories were covered: telecoms and IT 
(20.6%); commodities and chemicals (15.5%); miscellaneous business services 
(12.1%); miscellaneous materials, e.g. printed materials (11.2%); professional 
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services (11.2%); industrial equipment (7.2%); and others (21.6%). In terms of 
position in the organisation, 25.5% of respondents were procurement 
executives/directors, 48.9% were procurement managers and 11.2% were buyers or 
senior buyers. The remaining 12.2% were general managers involved in procurement. 
Most of the respondents were from the UK (73.4%). Others came from Africa 
(18.1%), Europe (4.2%), and the rest of the world (4.2%).  
 
All of the respondents had been prominently involved in, and were therefore highly 
knowledgeable about, the situation on which they reported. All of the suppliers 
reported on by the respondents were private sector, for-profit organisations; no public 
or third sector suppliers were covered. The research sample included respondents 
from both public and private sector buying organisations. This allowed a public sector 
dummy variable to be included to assess differences in procurement and contract 
management practices and outcomes between the two sectors. 
 
Variable measures and scale development 
In selecting both the independent and dependent variables, we have been guided by 
the relevant literature (for example, Williamson, 1985; Klein, 1996; Anderson and 
Dekker, 2005). Given the breadth of our research study, however, not all aspects of 
the concepts arising out of the relevant literature were covered by the questionnaire. 
Instead we questioned the respondents about certain aspects of the concepts that can 
be used to qualify relevant transaction characteristics, management control 
mechanisms and types of opportunism. While this was done to prevent the 
questionnaire from becoming overly long in an effort to achieve a good response rate, 
the authors recognise that as a result they can make no claim that the research is 
comprehensive in terms of testing the literature. 
 
Independent variables  
In what follows, we describe how we measured our latent independent variables. A 
statistical description of each of the six independent variables is provided in Table 1 
(Panel A). 
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(i) Transaction importance 
Buying organisations are potentially vulnerable to supplier opportunism when what 
they are buying is strategically and/or operationally important. This is because they 
are likely to be in a position where they will have to make a purchase and see through 
the contractual period. Choosing not to buy is not an option. We used two indicators, 
opeimp and strimp, to measure this transaction characteristic. 
 
(ii) Competition and supplier bargaining power 
We were interested to understand if more powerful suppliers, facing less intense 
competitive pressure and dealing with dependent buyers, would be more prone to 
opportunistic behaviour (Lonsdale, 2005). Buyer-supplier power across the 180 
contract management situations was measured using the indicator market and a range 
of power relationships were found. 
  
(iii) Uncertainty 
Uncertainty is a concept that has many manifestations (Sanderson, 2012). In line with 
Williamson (1985), we focused here on the ex ante specification problem. This 
problem can cause contractual incompleteness that, in turn, creates vulnerability to 
opportunism, especially in the form of hold-up. It can also cause information 
asymmetry problems for buyers. Respondents were asked to report the extent to which 
future contingencies could be envisaged (indicator noenvcon), and the extent to which 
a common understanding of future contingencies could be achieved (indicator 
nocomcon).  
 
(iv) Sunk costs (transaction-specific investments) 
Transaction-specific investments, particularly when combined with the type of 
uncertainty described above, create potential vulnerability to supplier opportunism in 
the form of hold-up. The term refers to investments in human, site or physical assets 
that have little or no value outside of a particular transaction. Here we used two 
questions concerning the losses the buyer would sustain if the relationship ended, first 
in terms of investments in physical equipment (invphy), and second in terms of 
investments in training (invtrain). 
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(v) Purchase type 
We measured purchase type in two ways. First, we differentiated between goods and 
services purchases using the indicator service, with goods as 0 and services as 1. 
Second, we differentiated between types of agreement in terms of the complexity of 
the payment mechanism. This was measured by the indicator dpl, with fixed price 
agreements as 0, and flexible price agreements and other more complicated payment 
mechanisms as 1. We were interested to explore the argument that services purchases 
involving flexible payment mechanisms might pose hazards of supplier opportunism 
because of ‘plasticity’, that is greater scope for supplier discretion in the delivery 
process (Alchian and Woodward, 1988).    
 
(vi) Interdependencies with other transactions 
We measured the extent to which performance on a contract would affect a supplier’s 
ability to win further business from the relevant internal client or the buying 
organisation in general. The extent to which this is the case is a result of relative 
transaction interdependency. We used two indicators, perfresulta and perfresultb, to 
measure interdependencies with other transactions. The argument explored here is that 
transactions with high levels of interdependency are less likely to pose hazards of 
supplier opportunism than those with low levels.    
 
Table 1 here 
 
Dependent variables 
The following sections describe the measures and scale-development procedures for 
the dependent variables: management control mechanisms and problems of supplier 
opportunism.  
 
(i) Common factor analysis (CFA) of the management control mechanisms  
Our questionnaire survey gathered evidence about sixteen management control 
mechanisms that have been identified in the literature as having the potential to 
restrain supplier opportunism. These relate to the areas of pre-contract management, 
procurement actions, reputation effects and legal action. The questions that covered 
these mechanisms may have been subject to measurement errors and will also 
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inevitably be correlated to each other. To address these risks, we used common factor 
analysis to obtain four common factors.
2
 These are as follows: 
 
Factor 1:  Pre-contract management index: preconmanidx (higher values = more 
understanding of procurement requirement) 
Factor 2:  Procurement actions index: paidx (higher values = more control effort) 
Factor 3:  Reputation effects index: repidx (higher values = more track record) 
Factor 4:  Credibility of legal threat index: ltcredidx (higher values = more credible 
legal threat) 
 
In order to keep the common factors consistent with the original 0 to 10 scales used 
for the separate variables in the survey, they were rescaled with a mean of 5 and a 
standard deviation of 2. This was done to facilitate convenient interpretation of our 
results. Descriptive statistics of these four management indices are presented in Table 
1 (Panel B). 
  
The pre-contract management index loads on variables relating to the framing of the 
agreement. Key questions here concern the extent to which the internal client and the 
supplier have a clear idea of the buying organisation’s procurement requirements. The 
indicators used were clearidea, procurepro, comptension, suppliercleara, 
supplierclearb and supmonitor. Higher values represent a well-researched 
understanding of the purchase requirement. 
 
The procurement actions index loads on variables concerned with the time and effort 
required to research, negotiate, design and draft the contract. The indicators used were 
searsup, negterms and dedrcon. Higher values indicate that more resources have been 
devoted to these procurement actions.  
 
The reputation effects index concerns the extent to which the supplier’s reputation is 
known by the buyer. The indicators used were repuexpa and repuexpb. Higher values 
indicate that the supplier is well known by both the buyer and the industry more 
generally. 
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The credibility of legal threat index loads on items related to the credibility of legal 
threats to the supplier. The relevant variables are the chance of winning a legal case 
(lowwin), potential damage to the supplier relationship (reladamage), the impact on 
operational performance of a prolonged legal dispute (operadamage), the financial 
cost of a legal dispute (financost), and the size of any potential legal payout (lowpay). 
Higher values suggest a more credible legal threat. 
 
 (ii) Incidence of opportunistic behaviour 
Panel C in Table 1 contains the main variables to measure opportunistic behaviours by 
suppliers. The variables chosen were certain restricted aspects of adverse selection 
(AS), moral hazard (MH), pre-contractual hold-up (HU1) and post-contractual hold-up 
(HU2). These concepts were discussed earlier in the article as hazards that a cautious 
approach to procurement and contract management might seek to address. All 
variables are measured in a range from 0 to 10, with a high score reflecting a higher 
level of opportunism. It is important to note here that, in accordance with the 
literature, there is no expectation that all of the independent variables relating to 
transaction characteristics will cause a rise in the level of all four of the selected 
opportunistic behaviours. Certain problems of opportunism are understood as being 
mainly associated with certain transactional characteristics. 
 
We explored only certain aspects of the selected types of opportunism in order to 
ensure that the questionnaire survey was not overly long. It was felt that aspects of 
each opportunism type would together provide a sample of potential opportunistic 
actions and allow certain, if restricted, conclusions to be drawn about the efficacy of 
management control mechanisms. 
 
The incidence of adverse selection (AS) was measured in terms of whether the product 
or service lived up to the ex ante promises made by the supplier, and that of moral 
hazard (MH) by asking whether, following the signing of the contract, the supplier 
consistently came up short in terms of effort. This is what Milgrom and Roberts 
(1992) refer to as shirking. Two hold-up variables (HU1 and HU2) were also 
explored. HU1 was measured by a question asking whether, between winning the 
competitive tender and signing the contract, the supplier attempted to revise and 
renegotiate the terms of the deal – a situation known as pre-contractual drift (Lonsdale 
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and Watson, 2007). Evidence of HU2 was gleaned by asking whether, following the 
start of the contract period, the supplier attempted to revise and renegotiate the terms 
or take advantage of contract variations, familiar situations relating to post-contractual 
hold-up (Williamson, 1985).  
 
Specification and Results 
Relationships between transaction characteristics and management control 
mechanisms 
Table 2 reports the findings of our test of hypothesis 1. This hypothesis concerns the 
relationship between transaction characteristics and management control mechanisms. 
The findings show that transactions characterised by the selected ex ante uncertainty 
attribute are significantly associated with less extensive management control, 
especially pre-contract management (-0.6) and reputation effects (-0.53). Our results 
also show negative, although not statistically significant, associations between the 
selected uncertainty attribute and both procurement actions (-1.23) and the credibility 
of legal threats (-0.14). We also find significant negative associations between the 
sunk costs incurred by the buying organisation and the extent of management control 
through pre-contract management (-0.69) and credible legal threats (-0.53). Taking 
together the findings in relation to both the selected uncertainty attribute and sunk 
costs, we can say there is indeed evidence that certain transaction characteristics place 
a strain on the ‘feasible foresight’ of managers (Williamson, 1996). This reflects 
expectations in the literature (for example, Williamson, 1985). 
 
Table 2 here 
 
Our data also shows a significant negative association between the level of transaction 
interdependencies and knowledge of the supplier’s reputation (-0.98). This shows that 
when a supplier’s ability to win future business is dependent on its performance in 
current contracts, buyers are less concerned with examining the supplier’s historical 
track record. By contrast, purchase type is positively associated with knowledge of the 
supplier’s reputation (0.41). Service purchases with flexible payment mechanisms are 
shown to be associated with greater consideration of supplier reputation than is the 
case for goods purchases with fixed payment mechanisms. 
 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
16 
 
Finally, we note that, while the findings show no significant associations between the 
use of management control mechanisms and transaction importance, competition and 
supplier bargaining power, and the public dummy variable, the whole structural 
equation model exhibits a good fit (Fan et al., 1999). This applies across a wide range 
of fit statistics, including but not limited to those reported.
iii
 
 
In terms of hypothesis 1, therefore, we can conclude that evidence exists that certain 
transactional characteristics reduce the extensiveness of management control 
mechanisms. Some contributors to the literature (for example, Williamson, 1985) 
argue that this will increase buyer vulnerability to supplier opportunism. 
 
Relationships between transaction characteristics, management control 
mechanisms and supplier opportunism 
Table 3 reports the findings from our test of hypothesis 2 (Panel B) and hypothesis 3 
(Panels C and D). Table 3 (Panel A) also reports the findings of an alternative test of 
hypothesis 1. 
 
Table 3 here 
 
Panel A results 
The results presented in Table 3 (Panel A) are in many respects consistent with what 
we find in the single equation model reported in Table 2, but they produce more 
efficient estimations for our coefficients. Hence, we find that the conclusions drawn 
above regarding relationships between transaction characteristics and management 
control mechanisms (hypothesis 1) have become more broadly and prominently 
supported.  
 
As in Table 2, our results show that transactions characterised by the selected ex ante 
uncertainty attribute are significantly associated with less extensive management 
control through pre-contract management (-0.59) and reputation effects (-0.51). We 
also again find a negative association between this aspect of uncertainty and 
procurement actions, but this has now become statistically significant (-0.92). As 
before, more investment in sunk cost has a negative association with pre-contract 
management (-0.7) and credibility of legal threat (-0.54). We also find the same 
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significant negative association between the level of transaction interdependencies 
and knowledge of the supplier’s reputational track record (-0.98), but this time we 
also see significant evidence of less extensive procurement actions (-0.9) as 
interdependencies increase. Purchase type is once again positively associated with 
management control through reputation effects (0.41). We also now see evidence of a 
significant positive association between purchase type and the effort put into 
procurement actions (2.72).  
 
As before, we find no evidence of significant associations between the use of 
management control mechanisms and transaction importance, competition and 
supplier bargaining power, and the public dummy variable.  
 
Panel B results 
Panel B presents the results of our test of hypothesis 2, which proposes that increases 
in the extensiveness of management control mechanisms will reduce incidences of 
supplier opportunism. Our data provide some support for this hypothesis.  
 
In the case of pre-contract management, we find a significant association. More 
extensive pre-contract management is significantly associated with fewer problems of 
the selected aspect of adverse selection (AS, -0.13), pre-contract hold-up (HU1, -0.22) 
and post-contract hold-up (HU2, -0.15). Our findings show an association between 
knowledge of supplier reputation and all four opportunistic behaviours: the selected 
aspect of adverse selection (AS, -0.3), the selected aspect of moral hazard (MH, -0.4), 
pre-contractual hold-up (HU1, -0.3) and post-contractual hold-up (HU2, -0.36). 
Finally, we find that a credible legal threat is significantly associated with a reduced 
incidence of two of the four supplier opportunism problems, the selected aspect of 
adverse selection (AS, -0.12) and post-contractual hold-up (HU2, -0.15). The results 
for the procurement actions index have big values and show that more control effort 
led to lower opportunism, but they are not statistically significant. 
 
Panel C and D results 
The results of our test of hypothesis 3 are presented in Panels C and D. This 
hypothesis concerns the relationship between transaction characteristics and supplier 
opportunism, both without the intervening variable of management control 
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mechanisms (the structural form) and with the intervening variable (the reduced 
form). We test the argument that more hazardous transaction characteristics will lead 
to increased incidences of supplier opportunism, but that this outcome will be 
influenced by the extensiveness of management control mechanisms. 
 
In the structural form (Panel C), our findings are broadly supportive of the argument 
that increased transactional hazards will lead to increased incidences of opportunism, 
but none of the results are statistically significant. The effects of transaction 
characteristics on opportunism become much more significant when we look at the 
reduced form of our model (Panel D). This complements the data on hypothesis 2 in 
that it provides further evidence that the extensiveness of management control 
mechanisms has an important impact on opportunism. 
 
On a detailed level, we found that our selected types of opportunism are a particular 
problem for buying organisations when transactions are characterised by our selected 
ex ante uncertainty attribute and significant sunk costs. The results show a significant 
positive association between the selected uncertainty attribute and both the selected 
aspect of adverse selection (AS, 0.63) and the selected aspect of moral hazard (MH, 
0.66). A high level of sunk cost investment, meanwhile, is significantly positively 
associated with the selected aspect of moral hazard (MH, 0.55). Beyond this, purchase 
type being a service with a flexible payment mechanism rather than a good with a 
fixed payment mechanism increases the incidence of post-contractual hold-up (HU2, 
1.04), while there is a significant negative association between the level of transaction 
interdependencies and the incidence of post-contractual hold-up (HU2, -0.53).  
 
Finally, although we find no significant association between any of the four chosen 
types of supplier opportunism and transaction importance, competition and supplier 
bargaining power, and the public dummy variable, the whole structural equation 
model does exhibit a good fit across a wide range of fit statistics.
iv
 
 
Conclusion 
In this article, we have used data from 180 procurement and contract management 
situations, 104 of them in the public sector, to test three hypotheses derived from the 
literature. We have also assessed whether there were significant differences between 
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public and private sector experiences. The evidence provided some support for the 
view that certain procurement and contract management mechanisms can assist 
buying organisations in moderating opportunism, but that certain transaction 
characteristics make the use of some management mechanisms difficult. The evidence 
found no significant differences between public and private sector experiences in any 
part of the study. We summarize our key findings below. 
 
First, we found that transactions characterized by a greater degree of hazard, in 
particular, the selected ex ante uncertainty attribute and sunk costs, tended to be 
associated with less extensive management control mechanisms. This was in line with 
the expectation of the literature (for example, Williamson, 1985 and 1996). Second, 
our evidence showed that increased extensiveness of management control 
mechanisms tended to reduce incidences of supplier opportunism. Efforts to establish 
supplier track record and reputation had the broadest impact, with the evidence 
showing a significant negative association across all four types of opportunism. Pre-
contract management and credible legal threats also had a significant impact in 
reducing the selected aspect of adverse selection and hold-up. There is some evidence, 
therefore, that supplier opportunism can be addressed through elements of what we 
have called a cautious approach. These significant impacts are illustrated in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2 here 
 
Third, we found that transactions characterized by a greater degree of hazard, in 
particular the selected ex ante uncertainty attribute and sunk costs, were associated 
with a greater incidence of supplier opportunism. The selected aspects of adverse 
selection and moral hazard were the most prominent problems. These positive 
associations were only statistically significant, however, when modelled with the 
intervening variable of management control mechanisms. This again suggests that the 
degree to which supplier opportunism is a problem can be influenced by the 
extensiveness of management control mechanisms.  
 
Given these findings, there is merit in considering in more detail what a cautious 
approach to procurement and contract management might entail. There are a number 
of main elements that arise specifically from this research: 
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 Time and effort in ensuring, particularly in the case of significant procurement 
exercises, that, in so far as uncertainty allows, there is clarity over purchase 
requirements and that those requirements are communicated effectively to 
suppliers. Opportunistic suppliers will seek to take advantage of both a lack of 
clarity (and any consequent contractual incompleteness) and frequent changes 
to the purchase requirement. 
 Time and effort in researching the attributes of the supplier so as to address the 
possibility of adverse selection. It is common for suppliers to exaggerate their 
capabilities. 
 Enquiries into a supplier’s reputation and track record prior to selection. 
 Time and effort, particularly in the case of those procurement exercises that 
pose a risk of supplier opportunism, to carefully draw up a contract that will 
protect against potential opportunism. In terms of addressing hold-up, the 
contract might contain balancing provisions, for example, liquidated damages 
and property rights allocation (Williamson, 1985). In terms of addressing 
moral hazard, the contract might contain performance incentives. 
 A common feature of procurement practice is the tendency to ‘let and forget’. 
A cautious approach warns against this and includes effective monitoring to 
address potential moral hazard. This runs in combination with the 
aforementioned incentive provisions within the contract (Baron and Besanko, 
1987). 
 Active promotion of contingent renewal. Contingent renewal refers to a buyer 
communicating to a supplier that its likelihood of winning future contracts is 
dependent upon its current performance and behaviour (Bowles and Gintis, 
1999).  
 Signalling to the supplier the hazards that arise from wider reputational 
damage.  
 Finally, the retention of a credible legal threat. Clearly, court action is a last 
resort because of its costs and uncertainties. However, highlighting the 
‘shadow of the courts’ can provide an effect without actual legal action 
(Messick, 2005). 
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There are two other important features of a cautious approach, although these were 
not part of the research study reported here. First, such an approach dictates the need 
for buying organisations to agree a ‘protocol’ for both cross-functional internal 
discussions and interactions with the supplier, specifying which personnel are 
permitted to communicate with the supplier and in what ways (Hughes and Dickson, 
2009). The public sector has been identified as being weak in this area of practice (for 
example, National Audit Office, 2011). Second, this approach does not prohibit close 
collaboration with suppliers, but suggests that it should be undertaken with safeguards 
(Williamson, 1985). 
 
In terms of the broader implications of our findings, these can be identified for both 
public policy-makers and academics. For policy-makers, this research provides a 
reminder that supplier behaviour is highly variable and that the price of poor 
judgement is potentially high. The study is also a reminder to take with a pinch of salt 
those clichés, so often heard at policy-related conferences and seminars, which 
contend that success in procurement and contract management is about trusting 
relationships and not about contracts. Business markets are more challenging and 
complicated than that and a cautious approach to procurement and contract 
management can help buying organisations to cope with these challenges and 
complications. 
 
For the academic literature, this article adds further weight to the view that the 
concept of supplier opportunism is not one that can be ignored by those interested in 
procurement and contract management, including that undertaken within the public 
sector. Furthermore, the evidence presented here suggests that supplier opportunism is 
most likely to be a problem in just the kind of complex, uncertain and involved 
contractual situations into which governments are increasingly entering, for example 
complex PPP and PFI arrangements (Lonsdale and Watson, 2007). Public 
management academics have an important role to play in highlighting the challenges 
such complex procurements generate and the mechanisms that can be used to manage 
these challenges. 
 
Finally, we need to acknowledge the limitations of this research study and suggest 
avenues for future research. First, in order to make our data gathering exercise 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
22 
 
manageable, we considered a relatively restricted set of variables representing only a 
portion of the concepts suggested as significant by the literature. Future research 
could look at additional dimensions of the chosen transaction characteristics, ex post 
uncertainty for example, and at the impact of other characteristics such as transaction 
size and frequency. Other dimensions of supplier opportunism, for example strategic 
misrepresentation and quality shading, could also be considered. Second, while we 
were careful to ensure that the data gathered from our sample of buyers was robust 
and reliable, future research could usefully introduce triangulation with other sources 
of evidence on supplier behaviour and performance, both primary (for example from 
other actors in the buying organisations) and secondary (i.e. supplier performance 
data). Third, our survey reports only on transactions involving private sector, for- 
profit suppliers. Future research could consider transactions involving public and third 
sector, not-for-profit suppliers to see if similar associations to those observed in this 
study are in evidence. This would be an important extension to our research given 
recent contributions to the public sector management literature which suggest that the 
procurement of services from the third sector should be less formal and contractual, 
that is more trusting and less like the cautious approach outlined here, to take account 
of the distinctive social relations and practices of voluntary organisations (Carmel and 
Harlock, 2008; Buckingham, 2009). 
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1
 SEM allows us to model the measurement error of our latent variables. Additionally, it permits us to 
simultaneously estimate the relationships between transaction characteristics and the four management 
control mechanisms, while modelling co-variation amongst them. This is particularly important in light 
of theories that assume such control systems are jointly determined. Since our data are on ordinal scales 
and may not be normally distributed, maximum likelihood methods should perform well (Distefano, 
2002). 
2
 We calculated the Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin (KMO) measures of all 16 variables (Kaiser, 1974). All 
KMO measures are more than 0.5 and the overall KMO is more than 0.65, so we concluded that the 
variables have enough common factors to warrant the use of a factor model. According to Fabrigar et 
al. (1999) at least 3-5 measured variables representing each common factor should be included, and a 
sample size of 5-10 times the number of measured variables is required for accurate results from the 
CFA method. Our sample size was 180, so the possible number of measured variables for factor 
analysis should be limited below 36 (=180/5), and the number of possible common factors should be 
below 12 (=36/3). The Akaike information criterion (AIC) (Akaike, 1987) and Bayesian information 
criterion (BIC) were used to determine the appropriate number of factors. Both AIC and BIC indicate 
that 4 common factors are the best choice for the 16 measured variables. Next, using maximum 
likelihood estimation and an oblique rotation, we extracted four factors with eigenvalues greater than 
one. The factor analysis yields a well-behaved solution, with items typically loading on a single factor, 
loading greater than 0.30 and few significant cross loadings. Scoring coefficients from the regression 
method inform us that the factor is obtained as a weighted sum of standardized versions of the 16 
variables. 
iii
 Good fit is indicated by a Root Mean Squared Error of Approximation (RMSEA) of less than 0.07, a 
Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR) of less than 0.05, and the Goodness of Fit Index 
(GFI), Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index (AGFI), Non-Normed Fit Index (NNFI) and Comparative Fit 
Index (CFI) being above or around 0.9. 
iv
 Good fit is indicated by a RMSEA of less than 0.06, a SRMR of less than 0.05, and the GFI, AGFI, 
NNFI and CFI being above or around 0.9. 
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Figure 1: Relationships Estimated between Transaction Characteristics, Management 
Control Mechanisms and Incidences of Supplier Opportunism 
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 Table 1 Descriptive Statistics for Data Used to Construct Measures of Independent and Dependent Variables (N= 180)  
  Mean SD Min Max Skewness Kurtosis 
Panel A. Independent variables: 
 
Transaction importance  
   The operational importance of the transaction to the organisation?(opeimp): 0=None, 
10=critical 8.3 1.7 0 10 -1.6 6.3 
   The strategic importance of the transaction to the organisation? (strimp): 0=None, 10=critical 7.5 2.7 0 10 -1.1 3.2 
Competition and supplier bargaining power  
The market in which you were operating(market): 0=A highly dependent supplier,  10=A 
highly dominant supplier (monopoly)  4.7 1.9 1 10 0.5 2.9 
Uncertainty    
   Difficulty of envisaging all future contingencies (noenvcon): 0=fully foreseeable, 10=in the 
dark 4.6 2.0 0 9 -0.3 2.6 
   Difficulty of a common understanding of future contingencies (nocomcon): 0=fully foreseeable,  
10=in the dark 4.5 2.0 0 9 -0.2 2.5 
Investments in transaction-specific assets   
    Investments in physical equipment (invphy): 0=None, 10=significant, non-Re-deployable 
investments  4.7 2.8 0 10 -0.2 2.1 
Investments in training or competence development (invtrain): 0=None, 10=significant, non-
Re-deployable investments  4.4 2.6 0 10 0.0 2.4 
Purchase type  
    Transaction type (service) :  0=goods, 1=services 0.6 0.5 0 1 -0.4 1.2 
On what basis was the deal priced? (dp1): 0=Fixed Price Agreement; 1=Flexible Price 
Agreement, Flexible Price with Maximum Threshold, Cost Plus Agreement; Target Cost 
Incentive Fee (With No Maximum Threshold) Agreement ; Target Cost Incentive Fee (With 
Maximum Threshold) Agreement, Other; 0.7 0.5 0 1 -0.8 1.6 
Interdependencies with other transactions 
    Failure for it to perform adequately on this contract would mean that the supplier would not be 
used again by your internal client (perfrea): 0=Irrespective of performance, the supplier knew it 
would be re-used, 10=The supplier would have to ‘delight’ everybody in order to secure new 
business 5.9 2.5 0 10 -0.4 2.6 
Table
    Failure for it to perform adequately on this contract would mean that the supplier  would not be 
used again by your whole organisation(perfreb): 0=Irrespective of performance, the supplier 
knew it would be re-used, 10=The supplier would have to ‘delight’ everybody in order to secure 
new business 5.9 2.4 0 10 -0.5 2.9 
Other control variable  
    Public sector dummy: 0= private; 1=public 0.6 0.5 0 1 -0.3 1.1 
 
Panel B. Dependent variables (management control mechanisms)  
   Pre-contract management index: preconmanidx (higher values = more understanding of 
purchase requirement) 5.0 2.0 -2.1 9.3 -0.5 3.8 
   Procurement actions index: paidx (higher values = more control effort) 5.0 2.0 0.3 8.8 -0.2 2.5 
   Reputation management index: repidx (higher values= more track record) 5.0 2.0 0.5 8.1 -0.6 2.6 
   Credibility of legal threat index: ltcredidx (higher values= more credible legal threat) 5.0 2.0 -0.7 12.2 0.4 5.4 
 
Panel C. Dependent variables (supplier opportunism)  
   Adverse selection (AS):   
   The product/service in question lived up to the ex ante promises made by the supplier: 
0=completely fit; 10= in no way met with our expectation/supplier's promises 3.0 2.2 0 10 1.0 3.8 
  Moral hazard (MH):   
   Following the signing of the contract, the supplier consistently came up short in terms of effort: 
0=The supplier always tried to delight us; 10=The supplier only ever did what it absolutely had to  4.6 2.5 0 10 0.4 2.5 
   Hold-up (HU):    
   Between winning the competition and signing the contract, the supplier attempted to revise and 
renegotiate the terms (HU1) : 0= What was signed was what was delivered;  10=The supplier 
systematically went about trying to improve the profitability of the deal 2.8 2.1 0 10 1.1 4.4 
   Following the signing of the contract, the supplier attempted to revise and renegotiate the terms 
(HU2): 0= What was signed was what was delivered;  10=The supplier systematically went about 
trying to improve the profitability of the deal 2.9 2.2 0 10 1.0 3.9 
 
 Table 2 Relationships Between Transaction Characteristics and Management Control 
Mechanisms  (GAMMA) 
 
preconmanidx paidx   repidx ltcredidx 
Uncertainty  -0.60*** -1.23 -0.53*** -0.14 
  (0.18) (1.6) (0.19) (0.18) 
Transaction importance  0.2 -0.1 0.25 -0.25 
  (0.2) (0.92) (0.21) (0.2) 
Interdependencies -0.03 -1.14 -0.98*** 0.04 
  (0.18) (1.64) (0.2) (0.18) 
Sunk cost   -0.69*** -0.81 -0.23 -0.53*** 
          (0.2) (1.82) (0.21) (0.21) 
Purchase type  0.15 3.24 0.41* -0.14 
  (0.23) (3.2) (0.25) (0.23) 
Competition and supplier power  -0.07 0.19 -0.04 -0.14 
  (0.09) (0.39) (0.1) (0.09) 
Public -0.18 -0.25 -0.41 0.17 
  (0.29) (1.07) (0.31) (0.3) 
Degrees of freedom 61 
Chi-square (min.fit) 112.37 (p=0.00) 
RMSEA 0.063 
SRMR 0.048 
GFI (AGFI) 0.93 (0.85) 
NNFI 0.86 
CFI 0.93 
Notes: Each cell reports the maximum likelihood coefficient and the estimates of standard errors (in 
parentheses). ***, **, * indicate a p value of ≤ 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 in a two-tailed test.  
 
 
 
Table
Table 3 Relationships Between Transaction Characteristics, Management Control 
Mechanisms and Incidences of Supplier Opportunism 
 
Panel A. Relationships Between Transaction Characteristics and Management 
Control Mechanisms (GAMMA) 
  preconmanidx paidx repidx ltcredidx 
Uncertainty  -0.59*** -0.92* -0.51*** -0.08 
  (0.18) (0.51) (0.18) (0.18) 
Transaction 
importance  0.19 0.01 0.24 -0.26 
  (0.19) (0.55) (0.2) (0.19) 
Interdependencies -0.03 -0.9* -0.98*** 0.03 
  (0.18) (0.53) (0.2) (0.18) 
Sunk cost -0.7*** -0.59 -0.23 -0.54** 
  (0.21) (0.59) (0.21) (0.21) 
Purchase type  0.16 2.72*** 0.41* -0.13 
  (0.22) (0.55) (0.23) (0.23) 
Competition and  
supplier power  -0.07 0.13 -0.05 -0.15 
  (0.09) (0.27) (0.1) (0.09) 
Public -0.18 0.01 -0.37 0.2 
  (0.29) (0.85) (0.31) (0.3) 
 
Panel B. Relationships Between Management Control Mechanisms and Supplier 
Opportunism (BETA) 
  AS MH HU1 HU2 
ltcredidx -0.12* 0.03 -0.1 -0.15* 
  (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) 
paidx -2.68 -2.66 -3.92 -3.13 
  (3.38) (3.36) (5.28) (4.42) 
preconmanidx -0.13* 0 -0.22*** -0.3*** 
  (0.09) (0.1) (0.09) (0.08) 
repidx -0.3*** -0.4*** -0.3*** -0.36*** 
  (0.09) (0.1) (0.09) (0.09) 
 
Panel C. Relationships Between Transaction Characteristics and Supplier 
Opportunism  (Structural Form, GAMMA) 
 
AS MH HU1 HU2 
Uncertainty  -2.08 -1.98 -4.16 -3.41 
  (3.41) (3.39) (5.33) (4.46) 
Transaction 
importance  
-0.1 0.11 0.27 -0.02 
  (1.52) (1.51) (2.37) (1.99) 
Interdependencies -2.52 -2.91 -4.01 -3.69 
  (3.35) (3.33) (5.23) (4.38) 
Sunk cost -1.55 -1.09 -2.61 -2.36 
  (2.55) (2.54) (3.98) (3.34) 
Table
Purchase type  7.46 7.4 11.68 9.78 
  (9.34) (9.29) (14.6) (12.22) 
Competition and  
supplier power  
0.27 0.37 0.39 0.27 
  (0.87) (0.87) (1.36) (1.14) 
Public 0.07 -0.25 -0.06 0.09 
  (2.34) (2.33) (3.65) (3.06) 
 
Panel D. Relationships Between Transaction Characteristics and Supplier 
Opportunism (Reduced Form, GAMMA) 
 
AS MH HU1 HU2 
Uncertainty  0.63*** 0.66*** -0.27 -0.16 
  (0.24) (0.26) (0.31) (0.31) 
Transaction 
importance  -0.2 -0.03 0.14 -0.16 
  (0.22) (0.25) (0.27) (0.3) 
Interdependencies 0.18 -0.13 -0.19 -0.53* 
  (0.25) (0.27) (0.33) (0.33) 
Sunk cost 0.25 0.55* -0.04 -0.16 
  (0.28) (0.31) (0.38) (0.37) 
Purchase type  -0.01 0 0.83 1.04* 
  (0.46) (0.47) (0.63) (0.54) 
Competition and  
supplier power  -0.05 0.03 -0.09 -0.1 
  (0.1) (0.12) (0.13) (0.14) 
Public 0.15 -0.12 0.03 0.21 
  (0.32) (0.37) (0.4) (0.45) 
Degrees of freedom 87 
Chi-square (min.fit) 148.16 (p=0.00) 
RMSEA 0.057 
SRMR 0.045 
GFI (AGFI) 0.93 (0.83) 
NNFI 0.88 
CFI 0.95 
Notes: Each cell reports the maximum likelihood coefficient and the estimates of standard errors (in 
parentheses). ***, **, * indicate a p value of ≤ 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 in a two-tailed test.  
 
 
 
